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Abstract
This paper presents a model of information quality and political regime change. If enough
citizens act against a regime, it is overthrown. Citizens are imperfectly informed about how
hard this will be and the regime can, at a cost, engage in propaganda so that at face-value
it seems hard. The citizens are rational and evaluate their information knowing the regime’s
incentives. The model makes three predictions. First, even rational citizens may not correctly
infer the amount of manipulation. Second, as the intrinsic quality of information available
becomes sufficiently high, the regime is more likely to survive. Third, the regime benefits
from ambiguity about the amount of manipulation, and consequently, as it becomes cheaper
to manipulate, the regime is also more likely to survive. Key results of the benchmark static
model extend to a simple dynamic setting where there are waves of unrest.
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Will the information technology revolution make autocratic regimes easier to overthrow? Ac-
counts of the fall of the communist Eastern European regimes often stress the key role played by
the regimes’ inability to control information (Kalathil and Boas, 2003, 1-2). Similarly, some argue,
the information revolution of the 1990s will make the overthrow of regimes in China, Cuba and
Saudi Arabia more likely.1 But the relationship between information and autocracy has not always
seemed benign: Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union both seem to be troubling cases. New infor-
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1According to President Reagan in a 1989 speech: “Technology will make it increasingly difficult for the state to
control the information its people receive ... The Goliath of totalitarianism will be brought down by the David of
the microchip”. In a 2000 speech, President Clinton said that China’s efforts to heavily control internet use “is sort
of like trying to nail Jell-O to the wall,” while President G.W. Bush has said, in a 1999 campaign debate, “Imagine
if the Internet took hold in China, imagine how freedom would spread” [in Kalathil and Boas (2003, 1,155,13)].
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mation technologies like radio and film helped make the propaganda machinery of these regimes
extraordinarily effective.2
So, should we be optimistic that recent breakthroughs in information technology will lead to
the collapse of present-day autocratic regimes? To put structure on this question, I develop a
formal model of information quality and regime change. It leads to the conclusion that perhaps we
should not be optimistic. Section 1 outlines the model. A coordination game is played between an
autocratic regime and a heterogeneous population of citizens. These citizens can either subvert the
regime or not. Their actions are strategic complements and if enough of them subvert the regime
it is overthrown. Citizens are imperfectly informed about how hard this will be, and, in making
their decisions, must ask if others share their beliefs. The information available also depends on
exogenous technological parameters and on actions taken by the regime in a deliberate attempt to
manipulate information.
A regime manipulates information by taking a costly hidden action that shifts the distribution
of signals from which citizens sample. This action lets the regime send signals that at face-value
suggest it will be difficult to overthrow. The citizens are rational and form beliefs knowing that
their information is contaminated by this propaganda.
In equilibrium, citizens’ beliefs and the regime’s manipulation must be mutually consistent.
Section 2 characterizes the unique equilibrium of this model and explains why rational citizens are
not able to infer the amount of manipulation. Intuitively, since individuals are imperfectly informed
about the regime’s ‘type’ they are also imperfectly informed about the amount of manipulation
that has occurred. On average, individuals do discount their information because of the regime’s
misrepresentation, but they typically do not discount enough.
Section 3 shows the effects of changes in the information environment. As the intrinsic qual-
ity or precision of signals becomes sufficiently high, the regime is more likely to survive. The
regime’s propaganda apparatus is more effective when individuals are receiving, from a technolog-
ical standpoint, intrinsically high quality signals. I interpret this as suggesting that the informa-
tion revolution may not be as threatening to autocratic regimes as is sometime supposed. Loosely
speaking, the regime is able to ‘co-opt’ the information revolution so that coordination against
the regime becomes more difficult. More precisely, in equilibrium regimes are overthrown if their
type is below an endogenous threshold. If a regime manipulates it generates a signal distribution
with an artificially high mean that is strictly greater than this threshold. So if signals are precise,
in this situation many citizens have signals suggesting the regime will survive. And consequently
it is rational for any citizen, when contemplating the beliefs of others, to assign relatively high
probability to the event that they mostly have signals near this artificially high mean. At the
margin this makes any citizen less likely to attack and so the aggregate mass who do is relatively
small. This in turn makes it more likely that the regime does manipulate to create an artificially
high signal mean thereby validating the original beliefs.
2On Nazi Germany and propaganda (especially by radio), see Zeman (1973, 34-62). More generally, see Arendt
(1973, 341-364) and Friedrich and Brzezinski (1965, 129-147).
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I then ask if a reduction in the cost of information manipulation will help regimes survive.
In principle, a reduction in the cost of information manipulation has complicated effects because
it increases the amount of manipulation a regime wants to do but this change in the regime’s
incentives is known to citizens and they may be able to offset it. It turns out that regimes benefit
from ambiguity about the amount of manipulation. As costs fall, this ambiguity increases and so
do a regime’s chances of surviving. Lower costs of manipulation benefit the regime.
Section 4 uses the model to interpret research on the policies that China and Cuba have used
to offset the effects of the information revolution. I argue that there is support for the model’s
prediction that regimes benefit because they are able to co-opt an increase in the intrinsic quality
of information in a way that makes coordination more difficult. The model also helps reconcile
the views of researchers who argue that these regimes are successfully exploiting new technologies
to counter dissent [e.g., Kalathil and Boas (2003)] with those who argue that any success is due
to more traditional authoritarian methods such as arrest and seizure [e.g., Chase and Malvenon
(2002)]. The model implies that these policies for coping with dissent are complements.
In related work, Ginkel and Smith (1999) study a game between three unitary agents: a regime,
a group of dissidents, and the mass public. They focus on dissidents’ uncertainty about the regime
surviving and consider signaling by the regime. There is no information heterogeneity in their
model, however — dissidents and the public both receive the same noisy signal of the regime’s
type — and so there is no question of coordination failure or difficulty in forecasting-the-forecasts-
of-others. Karklins and Petersen (1993) show how mass unrest is constructed by individuals playing
a sequence of ‘assurance games’. They provide a rich discussion of coalition formation, but do not
consider information in a detailed way. Kuran (1991) and Lohmann (1994) are expressly concerned
with the role of information and the sudden overthrow of the Eastern European communist regimes.
Although details differ, both draw on the notion of an information cascade to generate sudden
regime change. To capture the effects of information accumulating over time, Section 5 shows that
the key results of the benchmark static model of this paper extend to a more dynamic setting with
waves of unrest and accumulation of information about the regime.
This paper draws on the ‘global games’ approach to coordination games with imperfect in-
formation that was pioneered by Carlsson and van Damme (1993) and Morris and Shin (1998,
2000, 2003). Coordination games often have multiple self-fulfilling equilibria.3 In the global games
approach, imperfect information about the underlying fundamentals can serve to select a unique
equilibrium. This paper differs from earlier global games papers because individuals’ information
is not exogenous but instead is endogenous through the regime’s manipulation decision.4
A motivating example: Ottoman Turkey. Nineteenth century Ottoman Turkey was a brutal autoc-
racy. But technological breakthroughs like railroads, telegraphs, steamships and mass newspapers
3See Cooper (1999) or Chamley (2004) for textbook discussions.
4Angeletos, Hellwig, and Pavan (2006) analyze a closely related global game where information is endogenous
because of signaling by the regime and show that this leads back to equilibrium multiplicity. Edmond (2007)
discusses in detail the relationship between their model and the one in this paper.
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— printed in Arabic, Persian and Turkish — spurred interest in world developments and provided
citizens of the Empire with a massive increase in the quality of their information. If technological
and informational improvements of this kind help overthrow autocratic regimes, then one might
think the citizens of the Ottoman Empire would be well placed to force change.
But no such change took place. The same improvements in information technologies also gave
the regime more control over its subjects. The ability to monitor communications and to rapidly
deploy troops both increased the power the regime could exercise directly and helped undermine
traditional sources of countervailing power. For decades, until the end of the Empire in the
aftermath of the First World War, improvements in information technology enabled more effective
autocratic rule (Hodgson, 1974, 253-256).
By contrast, in his discussion of this period of Ottoman history, Lewis (2002) argues that recent
technological developments lead in the opposite direction:
Television and satellite, fax and internet, have brought and imposed a new openness,
and are beginning to undermine the closed society and closed minds that sustain autoc-
racy. Similarly, the spread of education or at least of literacy to much larger elements
of the population has again imposed new limits on the autocracy of rulers ... (Lewis,
2002, 54).
But why? Why are these developments different; why have the late twentieth century’s tele-
graphs and steamships imposed limits to autocracy when their precursors did not?
1 Model of information, coordination and regime change
There is a unit mass of citizens, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. Citizens are ex ante identical. After drawing
a signal (discussed below) each decides whether to subvert the regime, si = 1, or not, si = 0. The
population mass of subversives is S :=
∫ 1
0
sidi. Citizens expect to get a larger payoff if they are
involved in the downfall of the regime. If the regime is overthrown a citizen gets random reward
w ∈ {w,w} with w < w and Pr(w = w) := µ(si) with 0 ≤ µ(1) < µ(0) ≤ 1, so there is more
chance of getting w if si = 1. The utility cost of subverting is normalized to 1.
If a citizen believes the regime will be overthrown with probability Pi, she will subvert when
the expected payoff from doing so is at least as large as that from not subverting, specifically if
and only if
Pi[w − µ(1)(w − w)]− 1 ≥ Pi[w − µ(0)(w − w)]
equivalently, if and only if
Pi ≥ 1
(w − w)(µ(0)− µ(1)) =: p (1)
where p is the opportunity cost of subverting. If p ≥ 1 it can never be rational for a citizen to
participate in subversion. To make the model interesting, then, we need:
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Assumption 1. The opportunity cost of subversion is not too high: p < 1.
Intuitively, this is an assumption about the attractiveness of ‘free-riding’. Free-riding is less of a
problem if the probability of being found out µ(0) is sufficiently high or if the penalty w−w from
being caught is sufficiently severe.5 With Assumption 1, free-riding is possible in principle but will
not occur in equilibrium.
The citizens face a regime indexed by a hidden state θ that is the regime’s private information.
The state θ is normalized so that the regime is overthrown if and only if θ < S. The payoff to a
citizen can therefore be summarized by
u(si, S, θ) = si(1{θ < S} − p) (2)
where 1 denotes the indicator function. Individual actions si and the population aggregate S are
strategic complements: the more citizens subvert the regime, the more likely it is that the regime is
overthrown and so the more likely it is that any individual citizen’s best action is to also subvert.
After learning θ, a regime may take a hidden action a ≥ 0 that incurs a convex cost C(a) where
C(0) = 0, C ′(a) > 0 for a > 0 and C ′′(a) ≥ 0 for all a. The regime obtains a benefit θ − S from
remaining in power and so has a direct aversion to S. Regimes prefer to avoid a Prague Spring or a
Tiananmen Square. Suppressing a revolt is resource costly to the regime and this cost is increasing
in the mass of rioters.6 If θ < S, the regime is overthrown and obtains an outside option with
value normalized to zero. The payoff to a regime is therefore
B(S, θ)− C(a) (3)
where B(S, θ) := 1{θ ≥ S}(θ − S).
Following a regime’s hidden action a, each citizen simultaneously draws an idiosyncratic signal
xi := θ+a+εi where the noise εi is independent of θ and is IID normally distributed with mean zero
and precision α (that is, variance α−1). So the density of signals is f(xi|θ, a) :=
√
αφ(
√
α(xi−θ−a))
where φ denotes the standard normal density. I begin by assuming that citizens have common
priors for θ and that this prior is the (improper) uniform distribution over the whole real line. The
realization of the signal xi is informative for both the type of the regime θ and the hidden action
a. This action is itself informative about the regime’s type and rational citizens take this account
when forming their beliefs. In equilibrium, the action taken by a regime and the beliefs of citizens
will need to be mutually consistent. The timing of the model is shown in Figure 1.
5Perhaps it is more likely that a citizen will secure an influential position in the new regime if she participated
in the overthrow of the old regime. Or perhaps retribution is exacted on those who are thought to have let others
take the risks in overthrowing the regime. See, respectively, Jackson (2001) and Frommer (2005) for discussion of
the retribution exacted on collaborators after the liberation of France and Czechoslovakia from Nazi rule.
6Also, and loosely speaking, observations of large S might be able to convince foreign powers that it would be
easy to assist the regime’s opponents it in bringing the regime down. As emphasized by Skocpol (1979), deteriorating
relations with foreign powers can provide crucial opportunities for social unrest.
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nature
selects θ
regime
takes a(θ)
citizens observe xi
form posteriors π(θ|xi)
take actions s(xi)
if θ < S regime overthrown
if θ ≥ S regime survives payoffs
aggregate mass S =∫
s(xi)f(xi|θ, a(θ))dxi
Figure 1: The timing of the model.
1.1 Equilibrium concept
A symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium is an individual’s posterior density pi(θ|xi), individual
subversion decision s(xi), mass of subversives S(θ, a) and hidden actions a(θ) such that
pi(θ|xi) = f(xi|θ, a(θ))∫∞
−∞ f(xi|θ, a(θ))dθ
(4)
s(xi) ∈ argmax
si∈{0,1}
{∫ ∞
−∞
u(si, S(θ, a(θ)), θ)pi(θ|xi)dθ
}
(5)
S(θ, a) =
∫ ∞
−∞
s(xi)f(xi|θ, a)dxi (6)
a(θ) ∈ argmax
a≥0
{B(S(θ, a), θ)− C(a)} (7)
The first condition says that a citizen with information xi takes into account the regime’s
manipulation a(θ). The second says that given these beliefs, s(xi) is chosen to maximize its
expected payoff. The third condition aggregates individual decisions to give the mass of subversives.
The final condition says that the actions a(θ) maximize the regime’s payoff. In equilibrium, the
regime is overthrown if R(θ) := 1{θ < S(θ, a(θ))} = 1 while the regime survives if R(θ) = 0.
1.2 Further discussion of model
Interpretation of hidden actions. The hidden action a ≥ 0 of the regime gives it the potential to
bias the information citizens receive. If a > 0 citizens draw from a signal distribution that at face
value suggests the regime will be difficult to overthrow. This represents a situation where it is
common knowledge that the regime is able to exert pressure on editors, force recalcitrant generals
to stand on parade, etc — so as to depict itself as difficult to overthrow — but where it is not
possible to observe that pressure directly and it instead must be inferred.
Nature of the regime. The regime is autocratic in that it is socially desirable for the regime to be
removed and it is not opposed by competing political parties or engaged in strategic interactions
with other large players. The one-dimensional θ summarizes many characteristics of regimes. More
malevolent regimes have a high θ because they are willing to plunder society and have greater
incentive to resist a given amount of dissent. And since the regime is treated as a unitary actor, θ
also captures its degree of internal cohesion. If the regime is riven by factions or if the military is
ambivalent in its support, the regime may be more vulnerable. Similarly, θ is also affected by the
policies of foreign powers and their willingness to intervene for or against the regime in the event of
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an attempted overthrow. Critically, the regime’s type captures those aspects of the society about
which the regime has better information than do citizens.
Simultaneous moves and lack of communication. Every citizen receives her signal and makes her
decision simultaneously. There is no communication between them. Any concerns about informers
and the consequences of organizing against a regime also affect θ. If a lot of credible communication
is possible, θ is presumably lower. Section 5 below relaxes the assumption of simultaneous moves,
allowing a sub-set of citizens to receive information from the collective behavior of other citizens.
1.3 Exogenous information benchmarks
Two important special cases of the model are when: (i) the regime’s type is common knowledge, or
(ii) hidden actions are prohibitively expensive. In each case, citizens have exogenous information.
If θ is common knowledge, costly hidden actions are pointless and a(θ) = 0 all θ. The model
reduces to a simple coordination game with multiple equilibria. If θ < 0, any crowd S ≥ 0 can
overthrow the regime. It is optimal for any individual to subvert, all do so, and the regime is
overthrown. If θ ≥ 1, no crowd can overthrow the regime. It is optimal for any individual to
not subvert, none do, and the regime survives. If θ ∈ [0, 1), the regime is ‘fragile’ and multiple
self-fulfilling equilibria can be sustained. For example, if each individual believes that everyone
else will subvert, it will be optimal for each citizen to do so and S = 1 > θ leads to the regime’s
overthrow and the vindication of initial expectations.
If hidden actions are prohibitively expensive, a(θ) = 0 all θ and each citizen has private
signal xi = θ + εi. Because each citizen has a signal of the regime’s type, expectations are
no longer arbitrary. As discussed by Carlsson and van Damme (1993), Morris and Shin (1998)
and subsequent literature, this introduces the possibility of pinning down a unique equilibrium
outcome.7 In this equilibrium, strategies are threshold rules: there is a unique type θ∗ such that
the regime is overthrown for θ < θ∗ and a unique signal x∗ such that a citizen subverts for x < x∗.
Proposition 1. (Morris-Shin benchmark): The unique equilibrium thresholds x∗MS, θ
∗
MS simulta-
neously solve
Φ
[√
α (θ∗MS − x∗MS)
]
= p (8)
Φ
[√
α (x∗MS − θ∗MS)
]
= θ∗MS (9)
where Φ denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution. In particular, θ∗MS = 1−p indepen-
dent of α and x∗MS = 1− p− Φ−1(p)/
√
α.
If there are no hidden actions, a citizen with xi assigns Pr(θ < θ
∗
MS|xi) = Φ[
√
α(θ∗MS − xi)] to
the regime being overthrown and so the first condition says that if the regime’s threshold is θ∗MS, a
citizen with signal xi = x
∗
MS will be indifferent between subverting or not. Given this, the mass of
7This result depends on a relatively diffuse common prior. See Hellwig (2002) and Morris and Shin (2000,
2003, 2004) for discussion of the possibility of multiple equilibria in coordination games when public information is
sufficiently informative.
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subversives is Pr(xi < x
∗
MS|θ) = Φ[
√
α(x∗MS−θ)] and a regime with type θ = θ∗MS will be indifferent.
In the analysis below, I say that a regime’s hidden action technology is effective if in equilibrium
it does better than the Morris-Shin benchmark, θ∗ < θ∗MS = 1− p.
As information becomes precise, some regimes are faced with a large incentive to shift the signal
mean. To see this, notice that in the Morris-Shin benchmark, the mass of subversives is
S(θ) = Φ
[√
α (x∗MS − θ)
]
= Φ[
√
α(1− p− θ)− Φ−1(p)] (10)
As precision α → ∞, the mass S(θ) → 1{1 − p − θ}, a step function. So if the regime has
θ < θ∗MS = 1 − p it faces a unit mass of subversives, but if the regime has θ > θ∗MS it faces zero
subversives. A small reduction in θ∗MS would enable a regime with θ just smaller than θ
∗
MS to switch
from being overthrown to surviving. As information becomes precise, there is a large incentive for
marginal regimes to shift the signal mean.
To understand the consequences of information sets that are a function of the regime’s manip-
ulation, we need to study a more difficult equilibrium problem where the regime’s manipulation is
not trivial and citizens internalize a regime’s incentives.
2 Equilibrium with endogenous information manipulation
This model has a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium (Edmond, 2007). As in the Morris-Shin
benchmark, the equilibrium is characterized by thresholds x∗ and θ∗ so that for citizens s(xi) = 1
for xi < x
∗ and zero otherwise while the regime is overthrown for θ < θ∗ and not otherwise.
But with endogenous information the regime’s hidden actions also need to be taken into account.
Section 2.1 show how to compute the equilibrium. Section 2.2 sketches the properties of hidden
actions. Section 2.3 explains why citizens have difficulty inferring the amount of manipulation.
2.1 Solving for the equilibrium
Let xˆ, θˆ denote candidates for the equilibrium thresholds and let a(θ|xˆ) denote a candidate for the
regime’s hidden actions taking xˆ as given. Because of the additive signals, x = θ + a + ε, a unit
increase in θ and a unit increase in x perfectly offset each other in terms of their effect on the
regime’s desired action. Given this, equilibrium actions will depend only on the difference θ − xˆ
and can be written a(θ|xˆ) = a(θ − xˆ).
Regime’s problem. Taking xˆ ∈ R as given the mass of citizens facing the regime is
Sˆ(θ + a) :=
∫ xˆ
−∞
f(xi|θ, a)dxi = Φ[
√
α(xˆ− θ − a)] (11)
Since the regime has access to an outside option normalized to zero, its problem can be written
V (θ) := max[0,W (θ)] (12)
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where W (θ) is the best payoff regime θ can get if it is not overthrown
W (θ) := max
a≥0
[
θ − Sˆ(θ + a)− C(a)
]
(13)
Using the envelope theorem and the definition of Sˆ(θ + a) in equation (11) shows that W ′(θ) > 1
all θ. And since W (θ) < 0 for θ < 0 and W (1) > 0, by the intermediate value theorem there is a
unique θˆ ∈ [0, 1) such that W (θˆ) = 0. Using (12), the regime is overthrown if and only if θ < θˆ.
For θ ≥ θˆ, the actions of the regime solve
a(θ − xˆ) ∈ argmax
a≥0
[
θ − Sˆ(θ + a)− C(a)
]
, θ ≥ θˆ (14)
Threshold θˆ is found from
W (θˆ) = θˆ − Sˆ[θˆ + a(θˆ − xˆ)]− C[a(θˆ − xˆ)] = 0 (15)
So taking xˆ ∈ R as given, equations (14)-(15) determine the threshold θˆ and the hidden actions
a(θ − xˆ) that characterize the solution to the regime’s problem.
Citizens’ problem. Given the solution to the regime’s problem, a citizen with signal xi assigns
probability P (θˆ, xi) to the regime being overthrown
P (θˆ, xi) := Pr(θ < θˆ|xi) =
∫ θˆ
−∞
√
αφ[
√
α(xi − θ)]dθ∫∞
−∞
√
αφ[
√
α(xi − θ − a(θ − xˆ))]dθ
(16)
where the numerator uses the fact that the regime takes no action for θ < θˆ. Clearly P : R×R→
[0, 1] is strictly increasing in θˆ. An argument given in Edmond (2007) also shows that P is strictly
decreasing in xi, and for any xˆ ∈ R satisfies
P (θˆ, xi) = P (θˆ − xˆ, xi − xˆ) (17)
so that in fact P depends only on the difference θˆ − xi.
Now a citizen with signal xi will subvert the regime if and only if P (θˆ, xi) ≥ p. Therefore given
the solution to the regime’s problem as implied by (14)-(15), the signal threshold xˆ solves
P (θˆ, xˆ) = P (θˆ − xˆ, 0) = p (18)
To calculate an equilibrium, first solve the decision problem in (14) for arbitrary xˆ, θˆ. This gives a
family of hidden actions a(θ− xˆ) which can be used to construct the P function in (16). Since P is
continuous and strictly increasing in θˆ with P (−∞, 0) = 0 and P (∞, 0) = 1, by the intermediate
value theorem there is a unique difference θ∗−x∗ ∈ R such that P (θ∗−x∗, 0) = p. This solution can
be plugged into (15) to obtain a unique threshold θ∗ ∈ [0, 1) so that we know both θ∗ and x∗ ∈ R
separately. The equilibrium hidden actions are then a(θ) := a(θ − x∗). Moreover Edmond (2007)
shows that only this equilibrium survives the iterative elimination of (interim) strictly dominated
strategies and so it is the only perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game.
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2.2 Regime’s hidden actions
In equilibrium, hidden actions a(θ) are characterized by the first order necessary condition8
C ′(a) =
√
αφ[
√
α(x∗ − θ − a)], θ ≥ θ∗ (19)
The marginal benefit of an action is the associated reduction in the mass of subversives and at an
interior solution this is equated to C ′(a). For manipulation to occur (meaning a(θ) > 0 for at least
some θ), the cost function either has to be either (i) strictly convex, or (ii) if marginal costs are
constant, C ′(a) = c all a, then the level of c cannot be ‘too high’: c <
√
αφ(0) =: c. If either of
these conditions is satisfied, then actions are zero for all θ < θ∗ before jumping up discontinuously
to a positive value at the threshold θ∗. As the fundamentals of the regime become strong, costly
actions taken to generate a favorable signal distribution encounter diminishing returns and the
action profile dies to zero. Figure 2 illustrates.
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a c t
i o n
,  a (
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constant marginal costs
Figure 2: Equilibrium hidden actions a(θ).
Example: constant marginal costs. Let C(a) := ca for some constant c ∈ (0, c) where c := √αφ(0)
so that a(θ) > 0 for some θ. Then manipulating equation (19) shows that interior solutions to the
regime’s problem are given by
a(θ) = x∗ + γ − θ, θ ∈ [θ∗, θ∗∗) (20)
where θ∗∗ := x∗ + γ and where
γ :=
√
2
α
log
(√
αφ(0)
c
)
> 0 (21)
8The first order condition (19) for a(θ) > 0 may have zero, one or two solutions. In the event of two solutions,
only the higher solution satisfies the second order condition.
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This is an acute case of ‘signal-jamming’. All regimes that manipulate information pool on the
same distribution of signals. Citizens receive signals xi = x
∗ + γ + εi that are locally completely
uninformative about θ. If a regime manipulates, it generates signals with an artificially high mean
x∗ + γ = θ∗∗ > θ∗ and as α becomes large these signals are tightly clustered around θ∗∗.
2.3 Why can a regime manipulate beliefs in equilibrium?
If citizens are rational and know the regime’s decision problem, shouldn’t they be able to ad-
just their signal to account for the incentives of the regime so that at equilibrium information
manipulation has no effect?
This intuition is wrong. If there is lack of common knowledge of the regime’s type, a regime may
manipulate information in equilibrium so long as different types of regimes would take different
actions. To see this, suppose to the contrary that citizens ‘know’ any regime will take a constant
action aˆ > 0 (say) irrespective of θ. Then each citizen would adjust their signal up one-for-one
with aˆ so that the signal threshold would be x∗ + aˆ and the corresponding mass of subversives
would be S(θ) = Φ[
√
α(x∗+ aˆ−θ− aˆ)] = Φ[√α(x∗−θ)] independent of aˆ. Since actions are costly,
the regime would be better off with a = 0 and so this cannot be an equilibrium.
Any interesting candidate for an equilibrium action profile will not involve a constant aˆ in-
dependent of θ, because if actions are costly it is never optimal for a regime to take an action
in a state that corresponds to it being overthrown in equilibrium. This means that each citizen
is unsure about what action has been taken and this ambiguity allows the regime to manipulate
information in equilibrium.
Example: ambiguity about regime’s action. To see this, suppose a(θ) = 0 for θ < θ∗, but a(θ) = aˆ >
0 for θ ≥ θ∗. Also, for simple calculations let p = 1/2. In the Morris-Shin benchmark, from (37),
this would give θ∗MS = 1− p = 1/2 and x∗MS = 1− p− Φ−1(p)/
√
α = 1/2 too, since Φ−1(1/2) = 0.
But manipulating the conditions (15)-(18) with a(θ) = aˆ > 0 for θ ≥ θ∗ gives
θ∗ = Φ(−√αaˆ/2) + C(aˆ) and x∗ = θ∗ + aˆ/2 (22)
So if aˆ > 0 and the action profile is not constant, the probability Φ(−√αaˆ/2) < Φ(0) = 1/2 = θ∗MS
and the regime can achieve a lower threshold (an ex ante higher survival probability) and this
can be an equilibrium if the cost C(aˆ) is not too large.9 Moreover, holding fixed θ∗, the signal
threshold x∗ does not rise one-for-one with the level of the action aˆ: it only rises by aˆ/2. The
marginal citizen discounts their signal on account of the manipulation, but not by enough.
Once we recognize that different types of regimes take different actions, there is no common
discount factor that each individual can apply to her signal so as to ‘undo’ the manipulation. The
right discount factor to use depends on θ, but the citizens have heterogeneous beliefs about θ. The
ability of a regime to successfully manipulate information is inextricably linked to heterogeneity
9As shown in Section 3.2 below, if we restrict actions to a ∈ [0, a] then as the cost of information manipulation
becomes small (but remains positive) the equilibrium hidden action profile is a(θ) = a for θ ≥ θ∗ and zero otherwise.
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Figure 3: The cross-section of marginal factors m(xi) for various precisions α. A citizen with m(xi) < 1
assigns less probability to the regime’s survival if she takes into account manipulation; a citizen with
m(xi) > 1 assigns more probability to the regime’s survival.
in beliefs. If θ were common knowledge, costly information manipulation would be pointless. But
with lack of common knowledge of θ, there is no agreement on the appropriate discount factor to
give to an individual’s signal.
Equilibrium cross-section of beliefs. The marginal factor associated with each citizen’s posterior
provides a measure of the discount that different citizens want to apply to their signals. Suppose
a citizen with xi was ‘naive’ and believed she lived in the benchmark Morris-Shin world. Then she
would give probability Φ[
√
α(θ∗−xi)] to the regime’s overthrow. But a ‘sophisticated’ citizen who
takes into account a(θ) > 0 for θ ≥ θ∗ will instead give this event probability
Pr(θ < θ∗|xi) = Φ[
√
α(θ∗ − xi)]
m(xi)
where
m(xi) := Φ[
√
α(θ∗ − xi)] +
∫ ∞
θ∗
√
αφ[
√
α(xi − θ − a(θ))]dθ (23)
The marginal m(xi) is a measure of the discrepancy between the sophisticated and the naive
beliefs: a citizen with m(xi) < 1 assigns less probability to the regime’s survival if she acts
‘sophisticated’. Figure 3 illustrates. For low xi, the marginal is less than one and citizens discount
their signals but for high xi the marginal is greater than one. Why does the marginal density have
this shape? First, extreme signals result in marginals that are close to one since as xi → −∞
or xi → +∞ citizens assign almost the same probability to the regime’s survival irrespective
of concerns about manipulation. Second, the mere existence of the technology for manipulating
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signals is a form of aggregate information. Consider citizens with low signals. Since hidden actions
are non-negative, if a citizen has a low signal it is likely that the regime’s true type is low and that
it did not manipulate. But at equilibrium, if a regime did no manipulation it must be because
its survival probability is zero. Hence a citizen with a low signal will at equilibrium discount that
signal yet further, m(xi) < 1. The possibility of signal manipulation plus the low realized signal
itself reinforce each other to convince a citizen that the regime’s type must be low. Similarly, a
high signal might be because of manipulation, but active manipulation means that at equilibrium
the regime will survive with probability one. So if you have a high signal, you will rationally assign
more probability to the regime’s survival than you would if you were naive, m(xi) > 1.
The existence of a technology for manipulating signals amplifies the ex ante heterogeneity in
information, leading those with low signals to assign even less survival probability to the regime
and leading those with high signals to assign even more survival probability to the regime.
Although regimes may be able to manipulate information in equilibrium it does not immediately
follow that manipulation is effective in increasing the likelihood of the regime surviving. As shown
next, manipulation is effective when α is sufficiently high.
3 Information revolutions
This section studies changes in the information environment. Section 3.1 shows that if signals are
of high enough quality, manipulation is effective. Section 3.2 shows that if the costs of information
manipulation fall, regimes will have higher survival probabilities despite the fact that citizens know
they have an incentive to take larger actions.
Terminology. I measure the effectiveness of manipulation by its ability to reduce the threshold
θ∗ relative to the Morris-Shin benchmark of θ∗MS = 1 − p. A lower θ∗ increases the regime’s ex
ante survival probability making it more likely that nature draws a θ ≥ θ∗. I say that the regime
benefits from lower θ∗ even though this does not necessarily increase the regime’s payoff. It might
be that lower θ∗ is achieved through large, costly actions that give the regime an overall lower
payoff than they would get if hidden actions were impossible.
3.1 Increases in intrinsic signal quality
Let θ∗α, x
∗
α, and aα(θ) denote the equilibrium thresholds and hidden action profile indexed by the
precision α. Then:
Proposition 2. As the signal precision α→∞ the limiting thresholds and hidden actions are
lim
α→∞
θ∗α = 0
+, lim
α→∞
x∗α = 0
+, and lim
α→∞
aα(θ) = 0
+ for all θ
If in addition the cost of manipulation is strictly convex, C ′′(a) > 0 all a, then as α → 0+ the
limiting thresholds and hidden actions are
lim
α→0+
θ∗α = 1
−, lim
α→0+
x∗α = +∞, and lim
α→0+
aα(θ) = 0
+ for all θ
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For high enough α information manipulation is maximally effective. And there is a partial
converse.10 If costs are strictly convex, then for low enough α hidden actions are ineffective in that
θ∗ > θ∗MS = 1− p. If so, regimes would want to credibly commit not to use them.
Example: constant marginal costs revisited. The special case of constant marginal costs is again
useful for understanding what drives the result. We first need to solve for the thresholds. Use (20)
and rearrange the indifference conditions (15) and (18) to get
Φ[
√
α(θ∗α − x∗α)] =
p
1− p
[
c(x∗α − θ∗α + γα) + Φ(−
√
αγα)
]
(24)
and
θ∗α = c(x
∗
α − θ∗α + γα) + Φ(−
√
αγα) (25)
where writing γα acknowledges that coefficient defined in (21) also depends on the precision. For
each α > 0, these two equations uniquely determine x∗α, θ
∗
α [solve (24) for the unique difference
θ∗α − x∗α and then plug into (25) to get θ∗α]. The equilibrium mass of subversives that makes the
regime indifferent is
S∗α := Φ(−
√
αγα) = Φ
[
−
√
2 log
(√
αφ(0)
c
)]
(26)
This is strictly decreasing in α and S∗α → 0+ as α→∞. High α helps the regime engineer a small
mass of subversives. In turn, this means that as α → ∞ all regimes with θ ≥ 0 will survive. For
large α solutions to equation (24) are approximately the same as solutions to
1{θ∗α − x∗α ≥ 0} = −
p
1− pc(θ
∗
α − x∗α) (27)
The only solution to equation (27) is θ∗α−x∗α = 0. So as α→∞, solutions to equation (24) approach
zero too. From equation (25) we now know θ∗α → 0+. Therefore, manipulation is effective when the
precision α is large enough. For large α the threshold θ∗α is less than the Morris-Shin benchmark
of θ∗MS = 1− p and the regime’s survival probability is correspondingly higher.
Intuition for the result. Staying with the special case of constant marginal costs, if a regime ma-
nipulates, then from (20), it generates a signal distribution with an artificially high mean that is
strictly greater than the threshold, x∗ + γ = θ∗∗ > θ∗. So if signals are precise, in this situation
many citizens have signals suggesting the regime will survive. And consequently it is rational for
any citizen, when contemplating the beliefs of others, to assign relatively high probability to the
event that they mostly have signals near this artificially high mean θ∗∗ > θ∗. At the margin this
makes any individual citizen less likely to attack and so the aggregate mass who do is relatively
10As discussed following equation (20) if the marginal cost at zero is too large C ′(0) > c :=
√
αφ(0), then the
cost of information manipulation is so high that the model reduces to the standard Morris-Shin game. When we
take α → ∞ this bound does not matter. When we take α → 0+ this bound will be violated. Consequently, the
second part of Proposition 2 deals only with the case of strictly convex costs.
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small. This in turn makes it more likely that the regime does manipulate and create an artificially
high signal mean, thereby validating the original beliefs.
From a technological standpoint, signals may be intrinsically precise (of high quality). But
this does not necessarily translate into reduced posterior uncertainty for individuals. The direct
effect of higher α is to reduce posterior uncertainty, but there is also an indirect effect through the
regime’s hidden actions. Suppose the regime’s policy was linear, a(θ) = a0(α) + a1(α)θ for some
coefficients a0(α), a1(α) (this can’t be true in equilibrium, but it’s instructive nonetheless). If so,
citizens would have normal posteriors with precision α[1+a1(α)]
2. Then if α→∞ but a1(α)→ −1
sufficiently fast, the signals xi have no local information about θ even when α is large. The example
with constant marginal cost has slope coefficient exactly −1 whenever a regime manipulates and
so in this case signals are locally uninformative about θ.
Locally uninformative signals in the general case. To see how this extends to general cost functions,
rearrange (19) to get an alternative implicit characterization of the hidden actions
a(θ) = x∗ − θ +
√
2
α
log
(√
αφ(0)
C ′[a(θ)]
)
, θ ≥ θ∗ (28)
This is (20) generalized to arbitrary convex costs but at the expense of losing the closed-form
solution. By implicitly differentiating with respect to θ and rearranging, it’s possible to show that
a′(θ) ≥ −1 with strict equality if C ′′(a) > 0. But as α → ∞, regimes that manipulate have
a′(θ) → −1 so that signals are locally uninformative. Moreover, since generally a(θ∗) > 0, the
signal mean for a regime that intervenes is strictly larger than θ∗ so that manipulation is effective
as α becomes sufficiently large because each individual worries about a large number of others
drawing signals that suggest the regime is not going to be overthrown.
Numerical examples. With general cost functions the model cannot be solved analytically. Figure 4
shows θ∗α as a function of precision α under the assumption that C(a) := 0.5a
2 for three levels
of p. The higher the individual opportunity cost p, the lower the threshold and the thresholds
are decreasing in the signal precision. In these examples, the speed of convergence to the limit is
faster if p is high and slower if p is low. Regimes that inhabit a world where the individual cost of
subversion p is high may benefit most from a given increase in α.
Discussion and interpretation. These results suggest that a regime’s less overt propaganda appa-
ratus (pressure exerted on editors, generals forced to stand on parade, etc) will be more useful
when individuals are receiving, from a technological standpoint, intrinsically high quality signals.
In equilibrium signals may be uninformative, but that is precisely because the regime is co-opting
the technology to its own ends.11 A regime will want to exert a strong influence over the media
when the signal precision is high enough.
11A clear example of a regime co-opting new technologies for propaganda purposes is the sponsored diffusion of
the cheap Volksempfa¨nger radio set in 1930s Germany. By 1939, 70% of households owned a set — the highest
proportion in the world at the time (Zeman, 1973, 34-62).
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Figure 4: In the Morris-Shin game, thresholds are θ∗MS = 1− p all α. With information manipulation,
large α implies θ∗α → 0+, so in the limit all ‘fragile’ regimes with θ ∈ [0, 1) survive. Better information
increases a regime’s likelihood of survival. All calculations use C(a) := 0.5a2.
Proposition 2 does not obtain because a regime is somehow able to get away with a big shift in
the signal mean which, mechanically, would reduce the mass of subversives. Instead the actions are
‘just big enough’ and do not need to be large when precision α is high. As α increases the regime
benefits from the technology for manipulation because it leads to a change in the composition of
beliefs. Citizens receive signals through a high precision channel, but the regime is able to fine-tune
the message that individuals receive in such a way that pivotal individuals — who might think the
regime is fragile — do not act. Because of the coordination problem, this spills over to others and
so the probability of the regime surviving increases.
3.2 Lower costs of manipulation
Consider a technological change that increases the costs of manipulation. In a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium, this has two effects. Taking as given citizens’ beliefs, an increase in costs will decrease
the regime’s desired hidden action. But taking as given the regime’s incentives this will also lead
citizens to draw different inferences about the true θ. Which effect dominates?
Let Ck(a) denote a family of cost functions that satisfies Ck′(a) ≥ Ck(a) for all k′ ≥ k (with
equality if and only if k′ = k). Further, let limk→∞Ck(a) = limk→∞C ′k(a) = ∞ for all a > 0.
Assume the costs of any hidden action are bounded below by an arbitrarily small but positive
constant c > 0 with limk→0+ Ck(a) = limk→0+ C ′k(a) = c > 0 for all a > 0. This ensures the
analysis is only concerned with costly hidden actions and that in the limit we do not have a model
where manipulation is free. Finally, assume actions are chosen from [0, a] for some a <∞.
Let θ∗k, x
∗
k and ak(θ) denote the equilibrium thresholds and hidden actions indexed by the cost
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of information manipulation. Then:
Proposition 3. As costs of manipulation k →∞ the limiting thresholds and hidden actions are
lim
k→∞
θ∗k = θ
∗
MS, lim
k→∞
x∗k = x
∗
MS, and lim
k→∞
ak(θ) = 0
+ for all θ
Alternatively, as k → 0+ the limiting thresholds and hidden actions are
lim
k→0+
θ∗k = Φ[
√
α(ν−a)]+c =: θ∗0, lim
k→0+
x∗k = θ
∗
0+ν, and lim
k→0+
ak(θ) =
{
0+ θ < θ∗0
a θ ≥ θ∗0 (29)
where ν ∈ R is the unique solution of (1− p)Φ(−√αν) = pΦ[√α(ν − a)].
As k →∞, the costs of manipulation become extreme and no regime has a(θ) > 0. The model
reduces to the Morris-Shin benchmark. Alternatively, suppose k → 0+ so that manipulation
becomes cheap (but not costless). Then all regimes that survive in equilibrium will take the same
largest hidden action a while all regimes that are overthrown will, as usual, take no action. Each
citizen knows that the regime has taken one of these two positions. With some probability citizens
view themselves as living in the Morris-Shin world and with complementary probability they live in
a world where the mass of subversives will always be lower (in amount determined by a). Because
of this, they are always more reluctant to subvert the regime and the equilibrium threshold is
always less than the benchmark level 1− p. So lower costs of information manipulation increase a
regime’s chances of survival. Figure 5 illustrates.
Moreover (29) shows that θ∗0 is strictly decreasing in the largest hidden action a and that as
a→∞ the state threshold θ∗0 → c > 0. When manipulation is cheap and very large hidden actions
are possible, regimes may have high ex ante survival probabilities. This shows again that regimes
benefit from ambiguity about the nature of the hidden action they will take. If manipulation is
sufficiently expensive this ambiguity disappears and the game being played reverts to the Morris-
Shin benchmark with exogenous information.
4 How do autocratic regimes respond to the information revolution?
The model predicts that as the intrinsic quality of information improves, regimes may be more
likely to survive because in equilibrium they are able to co-opt the technology. Drawing on the
examples of China and Cuba, this section asks if there is evidence that regimes can benefit from
co-opting an information revolution and concludes there is. The discussion focuses on the internet,
but many points equally apply to technologies like satellite television and cell phones.
4.1 China
There is a degree of consensus that Chinese authorities, at least for the moment, have succeeded
in countering the effects of the information revolution [Chase and Malvenon (2002); Kalathil and
Boas (2003); Lynch (1999)]. Dissident groups — whether they be pro-democracy activists, Chinese
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Figure 5: As costs of manipulation fall, k → 0+, the regime takes either no action, a = 0 or a very
large action, a = a. The regime benefits from this extreme ambiguity.
nationalists, Falungong spiritualists, Tibetan nationalists, and activists on various sides of the
Taiwan question — have not been able to exploit new technologies to threaten the regime.
But there is less consensus as to how this successful off-setting of the information revolution
has been achieved. On one side of the debate, Kalathil and Boas (2003, 25-29, 37-40) argue that
Chinese authorities have indeed successfully co-opted developments in information technology. In
particular, Chinese authorities: i) monitor, filter, and block access to sensitive overseas web-sites
and email addresses,12 ii) require that internet service providers report on the activities of users,
iii) require censorship of bulletin boards and chat rooms, iv) use the internet to directly spread
propaganda and v) attempt to retard the effectiveness of dissident activities by hacking web-sites
and overloading email addresses.13
On the other side of the debate, Chase and Malvenon (2002) argue that the apparent success
of the Chinese regime has come from traditional authoritarian methods demonstrating, through
arrest, detention, and seizure, the supposed strength of the regime and the foolishness of engaging
in subversive behavior.14 For example, in December 1998, Wang Youcai, a leading member of
the short-lived China Democracy Party (CDP) was sentenced to 11 years jail based on email
communications with activists in Hong Kong and the US. In November 1999, other CDP members
12 Access to the internet in China operates through a two-tier system. First, local service providers connect
end-users to a backbone consisting of a small number of official and quasi-official networks. Second, international
connections are made through the backbone networks. It is as if the country had a nationwide ‘firewall’ — albeit a
somewhat porous one Kalathil and Boas (2003, 21).
13Chase and Malvenon (2002, 72) discuss examples of the hacking in July 1999 of Falungong sites by computers
with the same IP (internet protocol) address as the Chinese Ministry of Public Security.
14 Kalathil and Boas (2003) also discuss arrests and other direct demonstrations of state authority, such as the
police sweep of tens of thousands of internet cafes in 2001, but do not argue for the superiority of traditional
authoritarian methods.
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received jail sentences of 5 to 10 years for communicating with organizations the regime disapproves
of and for posting subversive messages on bulletin boards (Chase and Malvenon, 2002, 53). A school
teacher Jiang Shihua was jailed for two years for posting “We all think about one sentence that
none of us will say: overthrow the Communist Party,” (Kalathil and Boas, 2003, 26).
But examples of apparent success using traditional authoritarian methods, as provided by
Chase and Malvenon (2002) and Kalathil and Boas (2003), are not inconsistent with the model. If
the regime has a high willingness to imprison and otherwise punish dissent, then individuals face
a high individual opportunity cost of subverting p. And as discussed in Section 3.1 a high p and
improvements in the quality of information α are complementary in that the threshold θ∗ decreases
faster in α when p is high (as illustrated in Figure 4). So, rather than being viewed as competing
explanations, co-opting new technologies and traditional authoritarian practices should be seen as
partial but mutually-reinforcing explanations of China’s ability to offset the subversive effects of
the information revolution.
4.2 Cuba
Both the US government and the Cuban exile community have attempted to use information pro-
vision to overthrow Castro’s regime. Offsetting these efforts, the regime has engaged in relatively
sophisticated attempts to jam US signals beamed into Cuba.
The CIA began covert broadcasts into Cuba as early as 1960, the year after Castro took power
Soley (1987). This policy became more explicit with the beginning of broadcasts by Radio Mart´ı
(or ‘Radio Free Cuba’) in 1985 and TV Mart´ı in 1990 (Kalathil and Boas, 2003, 48). Although
radio broadcasts have had some success — at least in terms of attracting an audience, if not
in terms of bringing about regime change — TV broadcasts by the US government have been
notoriously unsuccessful due to Cuban jamming of the signal. In 2003, the US government began
to upgrade TV Mart´ı to a satellite broadcasting system in an attempt to strengthen the signal and
beat the jamming. In addition to US government-sponsored broadcasts, Cuban exiles operating
from the US have engaged in leaflet drops by plane.
Suppose we put aside any concerns that Cubans might have about the motives underlying
external propaganda and agree to treat all extra information as a pure increase in the quality of
their information. If we interpret an array of leaflet drops, satellite TV transmissions and sporadic
internet access as an exogenous increase in the intrinsic quality of private information α, then
from Proposition 2 we ought to predict that such improvements act to reduce coordination to the
benefit of otherwise relatively weak regimes.
This prediction seems to be born out in practice. So far, the regime has been relatively successful
at blocking these sources of external propaganda. Foreign providers of information have had to rely
on relatively diffuse means of communication to change the beliefs of the Cuban public. While this
may improve the information available to Cubans, it may also suffer from an inability to generate
a large mass of subversives willing to move against the regime. Improvements in information do
not necessarily help solve the coordination problem.
19
5 Accumulating information and waves of unrest
In models of information and regime change based on information cascades, such as Kuran (1991)
and Lohmann (1994), individuals’ decisions are staggered and some get to learn from the decisions
of others. But in the benchmark model of this paper, individuals simultaneously receive their
signals and so cannot learn from each other. This section extends the model by confronting
the regime with two ‘waves’ of unrest that cumulate into an aggregate attack. By observing the
outcome of the first wave, individuals in the second learn more about the likelihood of overthrowing
the regime. And a regime will take this into account when deciding how to manipulate information.
The key results of the static model of this paper extend to this setting.
Two waves of unrest. Let citizens be exogenously divided into two waves: a ‘leading’ wave of size
λ ∈ (0, 1) and a ‘following’ wave of size 1−λ. Let S1 denote the size of the first wave attack and let
S2 denote the size of the second wave attack. The cumulative attack is then S := λS1 + (1− λ)S2
and the regime is overthrown if S > θ.
Both waves get the idiosyncratic signal of the regime’s type xi = θ+a+εx,i with εx,i IID normally
distributed with mean zero and precision αx > 0. But in addition citizens in the second wave get
endogenous idiosyncratic signals yi about the size of the first attack. Let yi := Φ
−1(S1)+εy,i where
εy,i is IID normally distributed with mean zero and precision αy > 0.
15 If citizens in the first wave
attack when they have xi < x
∗
1 for some endogenous threshold x
∗
1, the size of the first attack is
S1(θ, a) = Φ[
√
αx(x
∗
1 − θ − a)] (30)
So the extra signals for the second wave are yi =
√
αx(x
∗
1 − θ − a) + εy,i. This is equivalent to
giving them signals zi = θ + a + εz,i where εz,i is IID normally distributed with mean zero and
endogenous precision αz = αxαy. If citizens in the second wave attack when they have xi < x
∗
2(zi)
for some endogenous threshold function x∗2(zi), the size of the second attack is
S2(θ, a) =
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ x∗2(zi)
−∞
√
αxφ[
√
αx(xi − θ − a)]√αzφ[√αz(zi − θ − a)]dxidzi (31)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
Φ[
√
αx(x
∗
2(zi)− θ − a)]
√
αzφ[
√
αz(zi − θ − a)]dzi (32)
The regime’s hidden actions a(θ) and cutoff θ∗ solve
a(θ) ∈ argmax
a≥0
[θ − S(θ, a)− C(a)] , θ ≥ θ∗ (33)
where S(θ, a) = λS1(θ, a) + (1− λ)S2(θ, a) and
θ∗ = S[θ∗, a(θ∗)] + C[a(θ∗)] (34)
15The specification Φ−1(S) for the signal mean was introduced (in a different context) by Dasgupta (2007) and
gives rise to a simple information structure.
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The single threshold x∗1 for the first wave and the threshold function x
∗
2(zi) for the second wave
solve the indifference conditions
p = Pr(θ < θ∗|x∗1) (35)
= Pr(θ < θ∗|x∗2(zi), zi) (36)
where the posteriors are calculated using Bayes’s rule. An equilibrium of this model consists of
scalars x∗1 and θ
∗ and functions x∗2(zi) and a(θ) simultaneously satisfying (33)-(36). I solve for an
equilibrium numerically, see Appendix B for details.
Discussion. The accumulation of information through waves of unrest means that a regime’s
manipulation has both a direct and an indirect effect on beliefs. As usual, there is a direct effect
through the signals xi. But there is also an indirect effect through the signals zi generated by the
first attack. In choosing its policy a(θ) the regime has to take account of both channels.
This model of leaders and followers is based on Angeletos and Werning (2006) but differs in
two respects. First, in Angeletos and Werning (2006) there is no information manipulation. And
second, in their model, the information generated by the first-wave is public rather than idiosyn-
cratic as it is here. This captures the idea that unrest may take place in many physically separated
locations and individuals are likely to have idiosyncratically varying amounts of information about
what has happened depending on how close they are to other centers of unrest.16
Numerical examples. Figure 6 shows θ∗ as a function of the signal precision αx for various sizes of
the first wave attack λ and levels of p. The left panel shows a low cost of subversion, p = 0.25 while
the right panel shows a high cost of subversion, p = 0.75. As in the static model, for high enough
signal precision αx the threshold θ
∗ is less than the benchmark Morris-Shin level of θ∗MS = 1 − p
and the regime benefits from the increase in precision. One difference is that with high p there is a
non-monotonicity in θ∗: for low αx, the thresholds are increasing and the regime is worse off than
the benchmark Morris-Shin case but the thresholds reach a peak before falling for high enough αx.
This monotonicity becomes less important when the size of the first wave is large. As λ → 1 the
model reduces to the static case where we know from Figure 4 that θ∗ is monotonically declining
in signal precision. More generally, when λ is high so that most citizens are in the first wave the
threshold θ∗ is low and the regime’s survival probability is high.
6 Skepticism
The model that generates these results is stylized and it’s reasonable to question it. Moreover,
even researchers who have concluded that autocratic regimes like China have so far been successful
16Angeletos and Werning (2006) are concerned with information generated by market prices and in this context
it is natural to assume that the generated information is public. They show that if market prices aggregate
idiosyncratic information, then the precision of the public information contained in prices is increasing in the
precision of underlying private information. Following similar global games with exogenous public information, this
can lead to ‘approximate’ common knowledge and reintroduce multiple self-fulfilling equilibria. See Hellwig (2002)
and Morris and Shin (2000, 2003, 2004).
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Figure 6: Thresholds θ∗ as functions of precision αx and size of first wave λ. With manipulation, a
large enough αx implies both that θ
∗ < 1− p and that θ∗ is declining in αx so that better information
increases a regime’s likelihood of survival. All calculations use C(a) := 0.5a2 and αz = αx.
in offsetting the impact of the information revolution are skeptical that this success can continue.
For example,
While Beijing has done a remarkable job thus far of finding effective counterstrategies
to what it perceives as the potential negative effects of the information revolution,
the scale of China’s information-technology modernization would suggest that time is
eventually on the side of the regime’s opponents (Chase and Malvenon, 2002, xiii).
One way to formally justify skepticism of this kind is to argue the main effect of the information
revolution will be to help citizens realize the returns from overthrowing the regime are high.
Higher returns from regime’s overthrow. Suppose that developments in information technology
cause citizens in a closed autocratic society to learn that the return to overthrowing the regime is
not w ∈ {w,w} as they had thought, but instead ξw for ξ > 1. This just means their opportunity
cost falls to p/ξ < p. The effects of such changes are straightforward:
Proposition 4. As the opportunity cost p→ 0+ the limiting thresholds and hidden actions are
lim
p→0+
θ∗p = 1
−, lim
p→0+
x∗p = +∞, and lim
p→0+
ap(θ) = 0
+, for all θ
But as p→ 1− the limiting thresholds and hidden actions are
lim
p→1−
θ∗p = 0
+, lim
p→1−
x∗p = −∞, and lim
p→1−
ap(θ) = 0
+, for all θ
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If citizens believed that the cost was p with return w and are surprised to learn it is ξw, for
big enough ξ almost all citizens find it optimal to subvert, the ex ante survival probability of the
regime falls, and no regime finds it worthwhile to take any hidden action.
Perhaps this is all that is meant when people talk enthusiastically of the role of information
technologies in overthrowing autocracies. Maybe ‘better information’ means that citizens will learn
the expected return to overthrowing the regime is larger than they had believed. This notion of
an information revolution is quite Panglossian. As a partial corrective, in this paper I emphasize
the more surprising result of Proposition 2, which suggest a dramatic increase in the intrinsic,
technological, quality of information may be exploited by regimes to inhibit coordination and
make their overthrow less likely. In reality, both notions of an information revolution are likely to
be at play. Better information may help citizens in closed autocratic societies realize that their
opportunities are not so limited, but it’s important to realize that at the same time higher quality
information may also help regimes inhibit coordination.
7 Conclusion
This paper presents a model of information quality and political regime change. If enough citizens
act against a regime, it is overthrown. Citizens are imperfectly informed about how hard this will
be and the regime can, at a cost, engage in propaganda so that at face-value it seems hard.
The most surprising result is that as the intrinsic quality of information becomes sufficiently
high, the regime is more likely to survive. A regime can co-opt a technological improvement in
the quality of information to make coordination against it more difficult. Perhaps information
revolutions are not so threatening to autocratic regimes as is often supposed.
The model yields two additional insights. First, even rational citizens may find it difficult
to filter their information appropriately when they are playing a coordination game and need to
forecast not only the behavior of the regime but also the behavior of their fellow citizens. Knowing
a regime’s incentives, citizens discount their signals. But they may not discount enough. Second, a
fall in the cost of influencing information benefits regimes. Regimes benefit from ambiguity about
the amount of manipulation they do. As the costs of manipulation fall, this ambiguity increases
and so does the regime’s probability of surviving.
The coordination game in this paper is deliberately stylized so as to focus attention on how a
regime can implicitly co-opt an information revolution. In keeping things simple, I have abstracted
from issues that could play a role in a more complete theory. For example, in this paper I have
assume free-riding is not a severe problem. But, rather than assuming it away, a more nuanced
treatment would examine how citizens might alleviate the free-riding problem by using strategic
communication to build credible coalitions.
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A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. (Morris-Shin benchmark): Let xˆ, θˆ denote candidate thresholds.
Posterior beliefs of a citizen with xi facing threshold θˆ are Pr(θ < θˆ|xi) = Φ[
√
α(θˆ − xi)]. A
citizen with xi will subvert if and only if Φ[
√
α(θˆ − xi)] ≥ p. This probability is continuous and
monotonically decreasing in xi, so for each θˆ there is a unique signal for which a citizen is indifferent.
Similarly, if the regime faces a threshold rule about xˆ it faces mass Sˆ(θ) = Φ[
√
α(xˆ−θ)]. A regime
θ will not be overthrown if and only if θ ≥ Φ[√α(xˆ− θ)]. The probability on the right hand side
is continuous and monotonically decreasing in θ, so for each xˆ there is a unique state for which a
regime is indifferent. The Morris-Shin thresholds x∗MS, θ
∗
MS simultaneously solve these best response
conditions as equalities
Φ
[√
α (θ∗MS − x∗MS)
]
= p (37)
Φ
[√
α (x∗MS − θ∗MS)
]
= θ∗MS (38)
Since Φ(−w) = 1 − Φ(w) for all w ∈ R, adding these equalities gives θ∗MS = 1 − p. And plugging
this solution for θ∗MS back into (37) and rearranging gives x
∗
MS = 1− p− Φ−1(p)/
√
α. 
The Proof of Proposition 2 is given in Edmond (2007) and is repeated here for completeness.
Proof of Proposition 2. For each precision α, there is a unique equilibrium. I find a unique
solution to a constrained problem consisting of the original system of nonlinear equations plus a
set of constraints that govern the asymptotic behavior of the endogenous variables. But, because
the equilibrium conditions have a unique solution for each α, the solution to the original problem
and to the constrained problem coincide.
The equilibrium conditions can be written
(1− p)Φ[√α (θ∗α − x∗α)] = p
∫ ∞
θ∗α
√
αφ[
√
α(x∗α − θ − aα(θ − x∗α))]dθ (39)
and
θ∗α = Φ[
√
α(x∗α − θ∗α − aα(θ∗α − x∗α))] + C[aα(θ∗α − x∗α)] (40)
with actions characterized by
C ′[aα(θ − x∗α)] =
√
αφ[
√
α(x∗α − θ − aα(θ − x∗α))], θ ≥ θ∗α (41)
Now let α→∞. The auxiliary constraints that govern the asymptotic behavior of the endoge-
nous variables are assumed to be
lim
α→∞
√
α(x∗α − θ∗α − aα(θ∗α − x∗α)) = lim
α→∞
√
α(θ∗α − x∗α) = −∞ (42)
If condition (42) holds, from (40) we have θ∗α = C[aα(θ
∗
α − x∗α)]. Similarly, if (42) holds, then
Φ[
√
α (θ∗α − x∗α)]→ 0 and the value of the integral on the right hand side of (39) converges to zero.
From (39) and (41), this requires
lim
α→∞
∫ ∞
θ∗α
C ′[aα(θ − x∗α)]dθ = 0
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Since θ∗α ∈ [0, 1] and C ′[aα(θ − x∗α)] ≥ 0 and is uniformly continuous in α , this can only be true
if aα(θ − x∗α) → 0+ for all θ ≥ θ∗α. But then if aα(θ∗α − x∗α) → 0+, C[aα(θ∗α − x∗α)] → 0+ and so
θ∗α → 0+ too. Finally, if both constraints are to hold simultaneously for large α, x∗α− θ∗α is positive
and x∗α − θ∗α − aα(θ∗α − x∗α) is negative. For both constraints to have the same sign, x∗α can neither
diverge nor converge to either a strictly positive or a strictly negative number. So x∗α → 0+. Hence
we have found a solution to the constrained problem.
Now for the second part of the Theorem. Recall that for this part we assume strictly convex
costs. Let α → 0+ such that √αx∗α → ∞ holds. Then x∗α → ∞. Since θ∗α ∈ [0, 1], we have√
α (x∗α − θ∗α)→∞ and the integral on the right hand side of (39) must converge to zero. Hence,
by (41), aα(θ − x∗α) → 0+ for all θ ≥ θ∗α (the strict convexity of C is assumed here so that (41)
holds for all θ even as α → 0+; with constant marginal costs, this would not be true). But if
aα(θ
∗
α − x∗α) → 0+, θ∗α ∈ [0, 1], and
√
αx∗α → ∞, then (40) requires that θ∗α → 1−. Once again we
have found a solution to the constrained problem. 
The proofs of Propositions 3 and 4 are similar.
Proof of Proposition 3. Let k → ∞. Then by assumption Ck(a) and C ′k(a) → ∞ for all
a > 0. But the citizen’s indifference condition [analogous to equation (39)] implies the bound
0 ≤
∫ ∞
θ∗k
C ′k[ak(θ − x∗k)]dθ =
1− p
p
Φ[
√
α (θ∗k − x∗k)] ≤
1− p
p
<∞
independent of k. Since θ∗k ∈ [0, 1], the only way this bound can be satisfied as k → ∞ is
if a = 0 for all θ ≥ θ∗k. Hence limk→∞ ak(θ − x∗k) = 0+ for all θ. It is then immediate that
limk→∞ θ∗k = θ
∗
MS = 1 − p and limk→∞ x∗k = x∗MS. Similarly, let k → 0+. Then by assumption
Ck(a) and C
′
k(a) → c > 0 for all a > 0. Since all positive actions cost the same amount in this
limit, if a regime takes any positive action, it will take the biggest action, a. Hence it is common
knowledge that either the regime take no action (if θ < limk→0+ θk) or the regime takes action
a = a (if θ ≥ limk→0+ θk). To find the limiting thresholds x∗0, θ∗0 follow the calculations leading to
(22) but allow for arbitrary p (instead of p = 1/2) and write a =: aˆ and c =: C(aˆ). 
Proof of Proposition 4. Let p→ 1−. From the citizen’s indifference condition [analogous to
equation (39)], this requires that
∫∞
θ∗p
C ′[ap(θ−x∗p)]dθ → 0+ and since C ′ ≥ 0 and is continuous and
θ∗p ∈ [0, 1], this can only be true if ap(t)→ 0+ for all t ≥ θ∗p. According to the first order condition
(19), this requires x∗p to diverge (x
∗
p → ±∞). But if x∗p → +∞, all citizens engage in subversion
which cannot be individually rational if p → 1−. Hence as p → 1−, x∗p → −∞. Then according
to the regime’s indifference condition, we must also have θ∗p − Φ[
√
α(x∗p − θ∗p − ap(θ∗p))] → 0, and
so θp → 0+. Similarly, let p → 0+. From the citizen’s indifference condition, this requires that
Φ[
√
α
(
x∗p − θ∗p
)
]→ 1− and since θ∗p ∈ [0, 1], this requires x∗p → +∞. Then the first order condition
implies ap(t)→ 0+ for all t ≥ θ∗p and the regime’s indifference condition implies θ∗p → 1−. 
B Computing an equilibrium with waves of unrest
Every citizen gets an exogenous idiosyncratically noisy signal xi = θ+ a+ εx,i. Fraction λ ∈ (0, 1)
of the population is in the leading wave with decisions based only on xi. The complementary
1 − λ fraction is in the following wave and get a second endogenous signal zi = θ + a + εz,i. An
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equilibrium of this model consists of scalars x∗1, θ
∗ and functions x∗2(zi) and a(θ) where citizens in
the first wave subvert if and only if xi < x
∗
1 and citizens in the second wave subvert if and only
if xi < x
∗
2(zi). In what follows, let fX(xi|θ, a) and fZ(zi|θ, a) denote the signal densities and let a
circumflex above a variable denote a candidate equilibrium object.
The posterior beliefs of citizens who face a threshold rule about θˆ and manipulation policy aˆ(θ)
are summarized by
P1(θˆ, xi) := Pr(θ < θˆ|xi) =
∫ θˆ
−∞ pˆi1(θ|xi)dθ∫∞
−∞ pˆi1(θ|xi)dθ
(43)
P2(θˆ, xi, zi) := Pr(θ < θˆ|xi, zi) =
∫ θˆ
−∞ pˆi2(θ|xi, zi)dθ∫∞
−∞ pˆi2(θ|xi, zi)dθ
(44)
where pˆi1(θ|xi) := fX[xi|θ, aˆ(θ)] and pˆi2(θ|xi, zi) := fX[xi|θ, aˆ(θ)]fZ[zi|θ, aˆ(θ)].
Given θˆ and aˆ(θ) marginal citizens, xˆ1 for the first wave and xˆ2(zi) for the second wave, are
determined using
p = P1(θˆ, xˆ1) (45)
= P2(θˆ, xˆ2(zi), zi) (46)
Given xˆ1 and xˆ2(zi), hidden actions for the regime are aˆ(θ) = 0 for θ < θˆ and otherwise
a(θ) ∈ argmax
a≥0
[
θ − Sˆ(θ, a)− C(a)
]
, θ ≥ θˆ (47)
where the aggregate mass of subversives is Sˆ(θ, a) = λSˆ1(θ, a) + (1− λ)Sˆ2(θ, a) with
Sˆ1(θ, a) =
∫ xˆ1
−∞
fX(xi|θ, a)dxi = FX(xˆ1|θ, a) (48)
Sˆ2(θ, a) =
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ xˆ2(zi)
−∞
fX(xi|θ, a)fZ(zi|θ, a)dxidzi =
∫ ∞
−∞
FX(xˆ2(zi)|θ, a)fZ(zi|θ, a)dzi (49)
The single cutoff θˆ is determined by the indifference condition
θˆ = Sˆ[θˆ, aˆ(θˆ)] + C[aˆ(θˆ)] (50)
I solve this model numerically. I first guess values xˆ1,n, xˆ2,n(zi), θˆn (say) and then solve the
optimization problem in (47) for the associated hidden actions, call these aˆn+1(θ). I then use
θˆn and aˆn+1(θ) to compute revised estimates of the thresholds xˆ1,n+1 and xˆ2,n+1(zi) from (45)-
(46) and use aˆn+1(θ) and the thresholds xˆ1,n+1, xˆ2,n+1(zi) to compute a new cutoff θˆn+1 from the
single condition (50). I iterate until the process converges. Standard quadrature rules are used to
calculate integrals numerically. More details and Matlab code are available on request.
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